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The decolonization process for the Pacific islands has been 
operative for more than two decades. Yet there remain two metropolitan 
powers which have yet to complete this often complex exercise -- France 
and the United States. The urge to compare their historical signatures 
in French Polynesia and Micronesia is decidedly irresistible. While such 
an exercise would necessarily include a variety of viewpoints and a 
litany of events and scenarios, this essay's purpose is to focus on one 
feature which has dominated the destinies of these two areas in different 
ways -- that is how time and space have influenced perceptions and 
reactions to the challenges of the past and the history of the future. 
Awareness is essentially a cultural characteristic which often 
distinguishes one particular society from another. 
There are many ways in which men are made aware, or 
rather make themselves aware, of the passage of 
time -- by the changing seasons, the alternations 
of the moon, or the progress of plant life; by the 
measured cycling of rites, or agricultural work, or 
household activities; by the preparation and 
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scheduling of projected acts and the memory and 
assessment of accomplished ones; by the 
preservation of genealogies, the recital of 
legends, or the framing of prophecies (Geertz 
1973:389 emphasis added). 
Things are placed in time as to the order of succession and in space 
to the order of situation. It is within the character of persons and 
groups to affect situations and the succession of events according to 
their own aspirations and sensibilities. This process determines how the 
past exists in the present or is predicted for the future. 
It is the belief in a comnon hiStory which creates 
the feeling that "people like us" have a future as 
well as a past. If the people of Oceania are to 
have a future in which they are something other 
than servile underdogs in an econanic system which 
is run for the benefit of expatriate Europeans and 
white Proericans then they need a history. But it 
must be a history in which the white skinned 
permanent residents of the region can also 
participate and likewise accept with pride. 
••• It follows fran all this that the local 
archaelogists and ethnohistorians are not just 
exploring the past in a detached, objective, 
"scientific" atmosphere. They are creating 
something which relates to the political present 
and the political future (Leach 1983:102,103). 
What is suggested by the foregoing and what is being asserted here 
is that the manipulation of time and space is as important as the 
manipulation of persons and events. With both the French Polynesian and 
Micronesian experiences in mind, this contention is especially 
applicable. To provide at least one example, one commentator observed: 
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••• Ponapean accounts of their own history seem to 
emphasize distinctions in space over temporal 
chronology. Individuals, events, and changes seem 
to be linked together by variations in spatial 
organization. Events are marked by where they 
occur, and epochs are known by names that usually 
refer to particular groupings of places rather than 
periods (Peterson 1983). 
It is proposed here that recent events, negotiations, and 
transactions in both French Polynesia and Micronesia were, if nothing 
else, exercises in the manipulation of time and space to secure 
particular results or to satisfy particular sentiments in fundamental 
political relationships. Any analysis of style and circumstances in 
either French Polynesia or Micronesia makes for good copy, but must by 
necessity distinguish the differences which characterizes these two 
unique areas of the Pacific. 
The circumstances of official American involvement in Micronesia are 
generally well-known. Beginning with the American victory at Manila Bay 
in 1898, the Spanish began to withdraw from their centuries-old position 
in the insular Pacific. With the expulsion of the Germans in 1918 and 
likewise with the Japanese in 1945, the United States came to administer 
Micronesia as a "strategic trust." Significantly, since then, 
Micronesia, especially the Northern Marianas, has encountered an 
extraordinary variety of colonial administrations and all within a 
comparatively brief period of time. These colonial administrations left 
a remarkable legacy of cultural, economic and biological intervention in 
island societies. The uncertainty of the past thus created the certainty 
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of the future in that change extends the time and space of the present. 
If Micronesians are to assume control of their future, they must 
manipulate time according to their own schedule, thus commanding a 
position of advantage. Indeed. the manipulation of the time and space of 
-
one people by another lies at the heart of any definition of 
colonialism. If nothing else. the American interest in Micronesia's 
future has been marked by a series of plans, that unique phenomenon or 
administrative ritual of predicting the future by analyzing the present 
(Kent 1982: 1-25). Perhaps the most notor.ious one of all, the Solomon 
Plan of 1963 noted: 
American and Micronesian officials in the area 
appear' still to be thinking in tenns of 
independence for Micronesia as an eventual, distant 
goal and there appears to have been little attempt 
to direct Micronesians toward thinking about 
eventual affiliation with the United States. In 
the absence of further action, the Mission believes 
that the momentum of previous attitudes and 
policies which did not involve the concept of 
affiliation will be hard to overcome. 
It can be stated quite unequivocally that the 
masses of Micronesia are not only not concerned 
with the political future but also are not even 
aware of it. They simply live in the present 
reality of the ",4merican time" that has replaced 
the "Japanese time." The· earlier Gennan and 
Spanish times are dimly, if at all, remembered 
(McHenry 1975: Appendix 1). 
Though the impact of the Solomon report upon U.S. decision-makers is 
not determinable, it nonetheless underscored a feeling that the nature of 
time and space for Micronesia was changing. In retrospect, the planning 
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process ·was probably the single most unique feature of American 
decolonial policy. Through such a mechanism the future, it was hoped, 
could be better ordered to achieve or avoid particular results. S~ch 
plans, in effect, became the propo~ed charters of the future. 
The establishment of the Congress of Micronesia in 1967 was 
significant for a variety of reasons. First, it marked the hope that 
there could be some "unity in diversity" among the Micronesian political 
elites. Second, the Congress became a ready forum for the initiation of 
proposals for the future political status of the islands. Third, it 
legitimized the new political leaders vis-a-vis their respective 
constituencies and the Administering Authority. As one experienced 
commentator remarked: 
The educated elite of Micronesia is, in a sense, an 
innovative group. They are revolutionary in 
character; they are demanding changes. 
Circumstances have thrown them into the role of 
opponents of the status quo and the Trust Territory 
bureaucracy, thus making them instruments of 
change. Because Micronesia has long been a static 
society, there is a need for innovators who can 
help bring about changes and make plans for the 
future. ••• No society is likely to renew itself 
unless its dominant orientation is to the future. 
This does not mean ignoring the past completely, 
but the society that is capable of continuous 
growth and renewal not only. is oriented toward the 
future, but looks ahead with some confidence. This 
is to say that an attitude of hopelessness will not 
bring about change. A society capable of 
continuous growth and renewal not only feels at 
home with the future, it accepts, even welcomes, 
the ideas that the future may bring (Heine 
1974:65-66). 
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By 1967, the future became the subject of the present. The 
establishment of the Congress of Micronesia's Future Political Status 
Commission ,created a vehicle (or oracle) for Micronesian aspirations 
concerning change and its work product would serve as the predictions of 
the mythical realities of the "alternative destinations" open to 
Micronesia (deSmith 1970:172). In that same year, the United Nations 
Visiting Mission commented: 
During its visit to Washington D.C., the Mission 
was told by an official of the Department of State 
that the United States Government anticipated that 
the inhabitants of the Territory would be called 
upon to decide. their political future within a 
reasonable period of time. This did not mean, he 
said, "in the distant future." The precise timing 
of the act of self-determination would depend 
largely upon the wishes of the people expressed 
through the Congress of Micronesia. The rate of 
development of a sense of community among the many 
islands and the progress of the Congress of 
Micronesia would be relevant to this. The United 
States Goverrvnent believed it would be premature to 
make any definite recommendatiqns regarding the 
Territory's future status ••• 
The Mission took every opportunity to test public 
opinion in the Territory about the possible future 
status to which the people aspired. The result 
showed that many had no clear idea about the 
possible alternatives open to them nor about the 
implications which the various options would carry 
for them. Most of them realized the extent of 
their heavy dependence upon the Administering 
Authority and seemed to have a genuine appreciation 
of the United States administration, but were glad 
of the special consideration and protection 
afforded them by their status as a Trust Territory. 
Perhaps the most cOl1lllOn reaction was to ask "Why is 
the United Nations rushing us? We are in no 
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hurry." ••• And many said they would like the 
United Nations trusteeship to continue without 
being prepared to suggest any definite period. 
They repeated the question: "Why is the United 
Nations rushing us? What is the hurry?" 
(1967:T/1668.47 emphasis added) 
It thus seems clear that while Micronesian elites were anxious to 
precipitate change, many other Micronesians were still situated in a 
"motionless present, a vectorless now," in a state of pennanent 
transition. As the Nathan report of 1967 observed: 
The Trust Territory is in the process of 
reevaluating its major politics and programs and 
expanding its role in development. Political 
conditions in Micronesia are now beset with 
uncertainty as the traditional political structures 
yield to the impact of modern economic pressures 
and burgeoning education needs. The newly created 
District Legislatures and the Congress of 
Micronesia are still feeling their way, deciding 
what they are going to do and how ••• 
Some of the leaders realize that the recent 
expansion in mass "American type" education will 
rapidly erode the ancient traditions and 
institutions, and they voice concern about the kind 
of economic and social system that will replace the 
one being rapidly destroyed. They wonder if a new 
system for providing social, economic and political 
hannony will emerge to fill the void (Nathan 
1967:47). 
Once the direction of their future political status was established, 
the process of drafting constitutions and negotiating political 
relationships began in earnest. The process was a period.of minimal 
time, the prologue of denouement, for Micronesian elites who if nothing 
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else, realized that the charters for the reordering of Micronesia's time 
and space were being decided. It is ilJ1)Ortant to emphasize that both 
sides of the negotiating table were under no definite time pressures to 
procure a final work product. Samuel McPhetres, the Program Developer 
and Researcher for the: Education" for Self-Government Program, Trust 
Territory Government explained in 1976: 
We have no fixed deadlines to work against. If you 
take any African country, if you take any of the 
places under the British or French colonialism 
where this type of process took place, you'll find 
that one of the great advantages of it was. that 
they knew already, the date which the status they 
were in would tenninate and the new one would 
begin. It would be administrative fiat. The 
colonial power would. tell you, "You will be 
inde~ent by 1977. Now go to work I 'r--"And so 
they d mount a program aiming at .that particular 
thing and you'd know ahead of time when the 
plebicites and the referenda, and so forth, were to 
take place. We don't know any single date for 
sure (Nufer, 1978:97). 
Such sentiments as expressed pennitted procrastination in the 
process. The efforts to draft a Micronesian constitution was undertaken 
with a spirit of optimism, but with the intention by many of the 
Micronesian delegates to manipulate time to their own advantage. The 
withdrawal of the Northern Marianas from the convention met with no 
OPPOSition and little comment, though such a move marked a significant 
change in American policy. In retrospect. one participant intimately 
familiar with the proceedings, noted that underlying the whole 
constitutional effort "was the tension of nearly a decade of inconclusive 
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negotiations between Micronesian and United States' representatives over 
the unresolved future status of Micronesia." It seemed that the entire 
logic of drafting the· political charter of the future "was probably 
premised as much upon necessity as upon the compatibility with the 
Widespread Micronesian tendency to temporize when confronted with matters 
of the moment, relying on the passage of time as an element of itself to 
contribute to their mitigation . if not solution" (LeMonde September 1, 
1970). 
By mid-1976, the Administering Authority, through then Director of 
Territorial Affairs Fred Zeder, announced to the Congress of Micronesia 
that the Trusteeship Agreement would be terminated i·n 1981. Whether this 
policy announcement was made as a corollary to the Northern Marianas 
separation from the Trust Territory is uncertain, but it did signify that 
the United States was attempting to regain control of time and space as 
it affected the future status negotiations. In mid-1982, Zeder, now the 
ambassador and personal representative of the President of the United 
States, signed the Compact of Free Association with Palau, the Marshalls, 
and the Federated States of Micronesia. In this respect, the divisions 
of space were clearly determined and the parameters of time delineated in 
precisely worded provisions. 
While the Micronesian case may be termed as the "management of space 
through the manipulation of time," the French Polynesian example could be 
characterized in almost obverse terms - the "management of time through 
the manipulation of space." Unlike most of Micronesia, the nature of 
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colonial rule in French Polynesia has been singularly unitary. The 
imposition of the French protectorate over Tahiti and the Marquesas in 
1842 marked the beginning of "direct rule." Traditional authority 
declined rapidly and by 1888 was administratively eliminated by the 
annexation of the islands by France. 
French colonial rule may be distinguished from its American 
counterpart in Micronesia in several ways. Aside from the obvious 
differences in scale and time, Tahiti became a pennanent settlement of 
expatriate transients, who for the most part, came to exercise political 
control of major institutions, the most important of which were the 
public and private school systems. Within the past two decades, another 
source of metropolitan intrusion into the islands appeared in 1963 with 
military and technological infrastructure created. by the nuclear testing 
program. The activities and facilities of the test project enhanced the 
perception that France clearly intended to monopolize the time and space 
of the islands to suit its own national and international objectives. 
The acquisition of the Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls from territorial 
control and the construction of pennanent facilities on Hao and Mangareva 
were the advance· measures of space manipulation. Additional 
infrastructure created at Fa'a'a and Pirae districts were indications 
that the testing program would be an effort of long duration. The 
extensive public works projects initiated with metropolitan funds and 
eqUipment had additional effects. Access to and from the outer islands 
improved conSiderably, thus extending by way of metaphor, the beach to 
the horizon. 
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French Polynesian aspirations for greater political autonomy have 
included the meaning of time and space management in their rhetoric, 
though greater emphasis has been placed on utilizing institutional means 
for effecting change and for pressing their case for either autonomy or 
independence. Curiously however, those very institutions, spelled out in 
the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, are the time and space 
charters which preclude change. More precisely, unlike the Trusteeship 
Agreement which contemplates some movement towards change in political 
status, the present French Constitution provides no mechanism for 
independence. There are, however, examples of political flexibility 
which bear on this subject. When Djigouti and the Cormoro islands in 
eastern Africa moved from territorial status to internal autonomy and 
eventual" independence, the interested leadership in French Polynesia (and 
New Caledonia) took particular delight that such a scenario could 
convincingly be adopted with respect to their own circumstances. 
Several distinguishing factors were articulated by the metropolitan 
government which rejected the extension of internal autonomy to the 
French Pacific territories. First, the eastern African territories were' 
predominately Muslim and assimilation had been negligible or 
non-existent. Second, the wishes of French colons in the Comoros have 
been accomodated by separating the island of Mayotte from the new 
independent state. French Polynesia (and perhaps New Caledonia) was 
unilaterally determined to be an assimilated territory whose patriotism 
to France had been clearly demonstrated during the course of two world 
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wars. lacking the constitutional means of change, the French Polynesian 
autonomists have had to rely upon ideology and political opportunities to 
press their case. The remarks of then French Polynesia deputy Francis 
Sanford were especially instructive of this: 
I accuse the French government of despising the 
Tahitians and ridiculing their representatives. 
For three years I have voted in support of the 
government ••• I and ~ friends have struggled to 
gain internal autonomy for the territory~ We have 
asked for no more than... an executive elected 
wholly by the (territorial) assembly and for 
regional canpetence for internal affairs... .Can it 
be reasonably assumed that our problems can be 
regulated in PariS? •• For three years we have met 
with a refusal on the part of the central 
government to carry on a dialogue ••• Patience has 
its limits and today these limits have been 
reached (Meller 1983:58). 
With time comes some change. Independence as a political goal 
became illusory as the nature of economic dependence (or perceptions 
thereof) expands to fill the time allotted. 
••• a segment of the PolyneSian population then and 
perhaps even now, has· been very timid about the 
idea of independence. It is this timidity that the 
French have played on to keep Polynesia tightly 
bound to them (Finney 1979:20). 
To cast this matter in conSiderably larger terms and in greater 
perspective: 
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••• relations with colonial peoples are the result 
of past history and not of the application of roles 
or performance of a contract. It is a fairly 
simple matter to alter a contract, but it is 
well-nigh impossible to forecast what effect this 
alteration will have on the course of events 
(Mannoni 1956:196). 
The psychology of aependence is not only a matter of attitudes, but 
clearly a state of mind induced by a reluctant loss of control over one's 
time and space to another. French Polynesian autonomists and even the 
advocates of independence have resisted the idea of preparing a temporal 
agenda, but rather have left that matter to the French administration. 
At least by 1977, the metropolitan government enacted a territorial 
bureaucracy. 
There is yet another facet to real and perceived notions of economic 
dependence. While territorial-metropolitan dialogue has been a 
rhetorical mirror-image, the French authorities have argued that 
political independence cannot succeed in view of island dependence on 
metropolitan ,subsidies. The local leadership has argued the obverse, but 
admittedly in less. convincing terms. Both sides of the debate, however, 
fully recognized that the time matrix for economic prosperity is less 
subject to control than an agenda for political independence. The making 
of economic conditions is a primary feature of such systems as is 
currently operative in the territory. Thus as long as a dominant segment 
of the island population can be mesmerized by the lure of material goods, 
its advocates can manage time to its advantage by prolonging the present. 
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Returning to the issue of the French nuclear testing program and its 
relationship to greater local autonomy, a salient feature emerges as 
significant. While local (and even regional) opposition to the tests 
have been vocal, they have been only intennittently so. There appears to 
be a definite uncertainty as to whether an end to the tests will come 
when French Polynesia is independent, as was the case with Algeria, or 
whether Tahiti will become independent when the tests end. It is clear 
that as far as the French military interests are concerned the latter 
scenario is . preferable. That would· mean that a prolongation of the 
present is the prevailing scenario on the political agenda. As the 
present is extended, the number of French colons in Tahiti will increase 
and their political and economic weight will create another dimension to 
the situation. 
As with Micronesia, French Polynesians have had considerable 
difficulty in overcoming the influence of national defense interests, 
especially when such interests are inaccessible or otherwise veil 
themselves behind another administrative agency. These parallels aside, 
colonialism and the colonial presence in the Pacific creates the 
boundaries of the past and the present, and the space where the future 
can not begin. 
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